NJSBA Family Law Section

It's right in the Rules.

Hanan

4:14-7. Subpoena for Taking Depositions

(a) Form; Contents; Scope. The attendance of a witness at the taking of depositions may be compelled by subpoena, issued and served as prescribed by R. 1:9 insofar as applicable, and subject to the protective provisions of R. 1:9-2 and R. 4:10-3. The subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce designated books, papers, documents or other objects which constitute or contain evidence relating to all matters within the scope of examination permitted by R. 4:10-2.

(b) Time and Place of Examination by Subpoena; Witness' Expenses.

(1) Fact Witnesses. A resident of this State subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition may be required to attend an examination only at a reasonably convenient time and only (A) in the county of this State in which he or she resides, is employed or transacts business in person; or (B) at a location in New Jersey within 20 miles from the witness's residence or place of business; or (C)at such other convenient place fixed by court order. A nonresident of this State subpoenaed within this State may be required to attend only at a reasonably convenient time and only in the county in which he or she is served, at a place within this State not more than 40 miles from the place of service, or at such other convenient place fixed by court order. The party subpoenaing a witness, other than one subject to deposition on notice, shall reimburse the witness for the out-of-pocket expenses and loss of pay, if any, incurred in attending at the taking of depositions.

Burkhardt v. Kastell, N.J. Super. App. Div. (per curiam) (6 pp.) Wife challenged the decision of the trial court disqualifying her lawyer's firm because former solo practitioner, who had mediated a prior dispute between the parties, was now a member of the firm. The divorced parties entered a post-judgment consent order that modified the MSA's parenting time provisions. Law firm represented wife in that proceeding. The parties disputed certain financial issues arising from the parenting time adjustment and the dispute was referred to a solo practitioner for mediation. The mediation resulted in a consent order. Solo practitioner later joined law firm that represented wife. When wife's law firm sought mediation on other issues, husband moved to disqualify the firm, which the trial court granted. Wife argued the trial court erroneously applied RPC 1.12 and damaged her due process rights. The firm had agreed to "wall off" the former solo practitioner from any contact with the proceedings. The court agreed that the trial court erred. The trial judge disqualified the firm because of a "psychological component" and husband's "comfort level." The trial court erred because the "appearance of impropriety" concept had been discarded and a party's "discomfort" was not grounds for disqualification in RPC 1.12.