Because it is the Court's decision, and the Plaintiff must always ask the Court to dismiss an FRO rather than tell the Court. Check R. 5:7A and comments:
11. Dissolution of Restraining Orders.
11.1 Dissolution on defendant's application. As to the general standards for dissolution of a final restraining order on application of the defendant pursuant to the good cause provision of N.J.S.
2C:25-29(d), see Kanaszka v. Kunen,
313 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 1998), requiring defendant, based on the record of the prior proceeding and its history, to make a showing of substantial changed circumstances warranting that relief and requiring a plenary hearing only if there were such a preliminary showing as well as the appearance of material factual disputes. Kanaszka overruled the holding in M.V. v. J.R.G.,
312 N.J. Super. 597 (Ch. Div. 1997), which required a defendant must wait one year before making the application. See also Sweeney v. Honachefsky,
313 N.J. Super. 443 (App. Div. 1998) (dissolution of the order depends on the specific facts of each case without prescribed time limits).
11.2. Dissolution on plaintiff's application. As to dissolution of a preliminary restraining order at the request of plaintiff before final adjudication, see Kelleher v. Galindo,
350 N.J. Super. 570 (Ch. Div. 2002), requiring, under the circumstances, plaintiff's actual court appearance rather than telephonic request.
The Appellate Division has not yet addressed the issue of the standard of proof required for vacation of a final restraining order on application of the plaintiff. The Family Part is split on this issue. Compare Stevenson v. Stevenson,
314 N.J. Super. 350 (Ch. Div. 1998), applying a "good cause" standard, and I.J. v. I.S.,
328 N.J. Super. 166,
177 (Ch. Div. 1999), requiring only a showing that the application is voluntary, that there is a lack of coercion, and that the victim understands the "cycle of violence." Although N.J.S.
2C:25-29(d) requires the application to vacate a final restraining order to be brought before the issuing judge or a judge having a complete record, the court in I.J. v. I.S. held that because of the impracticality of the same judge requirement, any Family Court Judge may, upon proper showing, vacate an order on the plaintiff's application. The court, in so holding, concluded that a "complete record" need not include the transcript of the FRO hearing and that the affidavit filed with it and the affidavit for dismissal and the testimony of the plaintiff at the dismissal hearing constituted a complete record.
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Jenny Berse, Esq.
Cranford, NJ 07016
(855) 326-5291
[email protected]
Original Message:
Sent: 12-12-2016 14:10
From: Alice Plastoris
Subject: FRO Dissolution - Help
what the court said is correct. because it is dissolution of an FRO the Plaintiff must go to court if consenting on the record. File your motion. Add a certification that the plaintiff consents and do a letter brief and make your argument in court. your case has the right facts.
Alice M. Plastoris, Esq.
Law Office of Alice M. Plastoris, Esq.
82 Speedwell Avenue, 2nd Floor
Morristown, NJ 07960
Telephone No. (973) 538-7070
Fax No. (973) 538-7088
Email: [email protected]
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