I totally agree with Deb. Our case law is filled with decisions where our courts have used equitable remedies, such as imposition of a constructive trust, to avoid the unjust enrichment of one party to the other's detriment in situations where the equitable distribution statute did not technically apply. As Justice Long noted in McGee v. McGee, 277 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 1994):
"While technically the house was denuded of its value prior to the ceremonial marriage between the McGees, contrary to the judge's conclusions, this does not end the inquiry. It is the complete factual scenario surrounding the parties' lengthy relationship which should have been considered here and was not. The case can be viewed from the vantage point of the shared enterprise of marriage beginning before the ceremonial act, see Berrie v. Berrie, 252 N.J.Super. 635, 600 A.2d 512 (App.Div. 1991); Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J.Super. 281, 543 A.2d 1062 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 287, 554 A.2d 844 (1988) or as one in which equitable remedies such as constructive trust, quasi contract or quantum meruit are invocable for equitable reasons. Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 576 A.2d 872 (1990). It is clear to us that the trial judge considered none of this."
More recently, See Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269 (2016)(New Jersey Supreme Court utilizing equitable remedies so that Wife would share in a $2.25 million bonus that her former husband was awarded and received after the divorce was over, even though it was not technically subject to equitable distribution, on the basis that wife had a reasonable expectation she would share in the bonus by virtue of the personal and financial decisions they made during their relationship).
See also Mitchell v. Oksienik, 380 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2005)(Appellate Division, in a dispute between two unmarried cohabitants who had lived together, stating, "Because the parties' relationship had dissolved, the Family Part of the Chancery Division, in response to a request for relief from either or both parties, justifiably applied its authority to order an equitable remedy, including a division of the assets of the joint enterprise, i.e., the net balance after satisfaction of existing debts and costs.")
Regarding alimony, again McGee v. McGee is your friend:
"Here, Mrs. McGee lived with Dr. McGee long before the marriage and gave up her job, if not because Dr. McGee asked her to do so, at least because he was willing to support her. She became financially dependent on him as early as 1981. Mrs. McGee made many non-financial contributions to the relationship during which, while she labored at home, Dr. McGee doubled his income. While she is not disabled, she is at a distinct disadvantage as to employability, especially at a level which would allow her to replicate the lifestyle she and Dr. McGee shared on his $200,000 plus income along with the equity he bled out of her house. Indeed, it is not clear to us that she is capable of "rehabilitation" at all. In view of the trial judge's findings and the purpose of rehabilitative alimony, as well as the fact that the judge did not address the long period of cohabitation in his opinion, we remand the case to him for a full consideration of the issues of rehabilitative and permanent alimony upon application of the proper standard. A full explication of his reasoning should be set forth."
Good luck!
_____________________________________
Brian G. Paul, Esq.
Certified Matrimonial Law Attorney
Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, P.C.
101 Grovers Mill Road
Lawrenceville, New Jersey 08648
Phone: 609-275-0400
Direct Fax: 609-779-6065
[email protected]
