New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

5. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

Robert E. Goldstein

Posted 01-25-2017 07:50 AM

David:

If this issue is not discussed at the symposium this weekend, it is being discussed at NJAJ Boardwalk at Harrah's Atlantic City on April 28. I am moderating the panel on the effect of the new law with Judge Zampino and David Salvaggio on the panel.

I agree with you on the substantive law.

Robert E. Goldstein, Esq.
Drescher & Cheslow, P.A.

610 Bridge Plaza Drive

Manalapan, NJ 07726

(732) 972-1600
Fax (732) 972-0038
E-mail: [email protected]

Visit my personal website: www.mydivorcelawyernj.com

Member, Middlesex County Bar Association, Monmouth Bar Association, New Jersey Association for Justice and New Jersey State Bar Association

IRS Circular 230 Notice: To ensure compliance with certain regulations promulgated by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, we inform you that any federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of (1) avoiding tax-related penalties under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, or (2) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any tax-related matters addressed herein, unless expressly stated otherwise.

This E-Mail message and any documents accompanying this E-Mail transmission contain information from the law firm of Drescher & Cheslow, P.A. which is "Privileged and confidential attorney-client communication and/or work product of counsel." If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution and/or the taking of or refraining from taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this E-Mail information is strictly prohibited and may result in legal action being instituted against you. Please reply to the sender advising of the error in transmission and delete the message and any accompanying documents from your system immediately. Thank you

Original Message

Original Message------

The understanding I have, based on other discussions here and watching the legislation as it evolved, is that the new statute was not intended to make any substantive change to the law on emancipation -- the "sphere of influence" test remains, with a presumption of emancipation and support termination at 18, rebutted by the "child" being a full-time student or disabled (with SSA determination as to disability creating a strong presumption).

My understanding of the purpose of the statute is to address that New Jersey didn't have a presumptive end date for support orders to be terminated. As a result, child support orders would remain open on the AOC's computers until someone got an order closing them. NJ had an inordinate amount of cases where a "child" was now 25 or even 30 and, because no one got an order to terminate support, the case remained open and, most often, arrears were accruing (with no one pursuing them since the parties knew the child was emancipated). Every State's funding from the Federal government is heavily influenced by its collection rate. New Jersey's is relatively poor at #16 in spite of our being the 2nd or 3rd wealthiest state with the 3rd or 4th lowest unemployment (anyone interested in the actual numbers / ranking, see chart as Exhibit Y with Motion for Summary Judgment on http://dpdlaw.com/kavadas.htm#4 ). There are other reasons. New Jersey hasn't reviewed and updated its enforcement procedures and policies since 1998 - although there's a bill pending to do so that we should all support - http://www.dpdlaw.com/cs.htm . States with the most recent revisions and "more carrot, less stick" job-training and similar programs have the highest collection rates, but our being the only state that left orders open forever was one big one. This is why the AOC went all-out in supporting the bill.

With the new statute, cases will administratively close when a child turns 19 unless the custodial parent gets an order continuing it. But it wasn't intended to change either the emancipation age nor the criteria for an over-18 child to remain entitled to support.

There's a lot of confusion about this. In the Turkeimer v. Burke case that Jenny Berse posted, there's a footnote saying "[FN2] ...N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 was enacted to create an automatic termination of support when a child reaches the age of nineteen." (I'm aware of the FN as this was my case on appeal and I'd read the opinion before today). I don't think that's correct either (but it was dicta; irrelevant to the Appellate decision). If it would help anyone working on the issue, the level of "disability" that Judge Flynn found to be insufficient to continue support ("social anxiety disorder" and an IEP) is set out in the briefs on the case -- http://www.dpdlaw.com/appeals.htm#Burke .

Neither do I think its correct to say that support now continues to 19 rather than "over 18 and beyond the sphere of influence" as per the below case law. The NJ Supreme Court's opinion in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982) sets out 18 as the age a child is responsible for himself/herself. A lot of States have overturned laws requiring support beyond 18. At what point can a court no longer require support - what's the Constitutional limit? I'm about as far Left as anyone, but don't think a court can or should say "well, your neighbor (or parent or friend or whatever) needs some money to get by, so you'll be providing that." The Federal government (for purposes of continuing benefits for a "child") says a "child" is no longer a "child" when 18 and out of high school.

Anyway, to answer the original question - I think the statute doesn't change the substantive law, just the procedure for closing cases. Over 18, the presumption of emancipation remains, and can be rebutted by (a) full time student status, or (b) disability, with SSA determination or lack thereof creating a strong presumption (btw, in another case I was involved in, the App Div just reversed a judge who under-appreciated the significance of an SSA determination when he said a party who had been declared disabled was also required to produce medical records or an expert - Corrello v. Corrello, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17860799217562533108 . App Div disagreed.).

I hope someone is covering / discussing this issue at the symposium on Saturday.

David Perry Davis, Esq.
----------------------------------------------------
www.FamilyLawNJ.pro
----------------------------------------------------
112 West Franklin Avenue
Pennington, NJ 08534
Voice: 609-737-2222
Fax: 609-737-3222

TAMMY McGARRIGAN, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN McGARRIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. A-1930-14T1.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted August 23, 2016.
Decided January 3, 2017.

. . .
Our analysis begins with the principle that "parents are expected to support their children until they are emancipated, regardless of whether the children live with one, both, or neither parent." Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super. 29, 39 (App. Div. 2004)). Children are emancipated when they have moved "beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtain[] an independent status of [their] own." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598 (Ch. Div. 1995)). This fact-sensitive evaluation must include consideration of issues such as the "child's need, interests, and independent resources, the family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial ability, among other things." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 2006). See also Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982).

When a child has reached the age of eighteen, the child is presumed to be emancipated, N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, but the presumption is not conclusive. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. Consequently, if a child has reached age eighteen, the person seeking to have parental support continue has the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption. Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div. 2015); Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308.

A well-established instance defeating a request for emancipation and requiring continued support occurs when a custodial parent proves the child remains a full-time student. Limpert v. Limpert, 119 N.J. Super. 438, 442-43 (App. Div. 1972). When a dependent child is enrolled in a full-time educational program, child support must continue. See Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 542 (2006) ("The Legislature and our courts have long recognized a child's need for higher education and that this need is a proper consideration in determining a parent's child support obligation"); Patetta v. Patetta, 358 N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 2003) (stating "while parents are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his or her enrollment in a full-time educational program has been held to require continued support").

6. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

Andrew M. Shaw, Esq

Posted 01-25-2017 09:45 AM

While I recognize the apparent intent of the Act, it seems clear that its language has changed the substantive law. I simply do not see how to avoid that result under the statute's plain language.

The statute refers directly to "termination of [the] obligation to pay child support," not something akin to "termination of enforcement of support obligations by the Probation Division." It specifically mandates that the obligation to pay child support "shall not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age." There is nothing in preexisting case law that would support such a bright line rule. It appears that child support thereafter is expressly disallowed unless designated some other form of financial maintenance under subsection (e)(1). A child over 23 years of age may seek a court order requiring payment of other forms of maintenance or reimbursement as authorized by law provided that the payments are "not payable or enforceable as child support." (Emphasis added). If the statute was intended to be limited to procedural matters and collection, it could easily have been drafted in that manner. It was not.

There is even a provision under 2A:17-56.71(d) preventing parties from "consenting to a specific termination date for child support" if that date "exceed[s] the date a child reaches 23 years of age." Thereafter, parties can consent to "financial arrangements" only if those arrangements are not "designated as child support." Previously, that was not the case.

These are substantive, not procedural, changes.

Statements issued alongside the bill clearly refer to the termination of the obligation to pay child support. (Emancipation language was removed because "the bill's provisions relate only to the obligation to pay child support, and not to other parental duties, rights, and responsibilities. As amended, nothing in the bill would affect the authority of the court to make judicial determinations regarding the legal emancipation of a child.") Thus, emancipation law remains the same and will continue to be governed by the "sphere of influence" test, but the law governing termination of child support has been radically reshaped.

Floor statements for S1046:

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S1.PDF

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S2.PDF

Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(1), read in conjunction, establish a more rigid test, without making any reference to the "sphere of influence," that governs whether a child may remain entitled to child support between the ages of 19 and 23. It's nevertheless plausible that subsection (b)(1) will be construed as procedural. Without doubt, however, the bright-line rule of termination at 23 is new and different.

Very truly yours,

Andrew

---

ANDREW M. SHAW, ESQ.

Divorce & Family Attorney

DeTommaso Law Group, LLC
73 Grove Street | Somerville, NJ 08876

t: 908.595.0340 | f: 908.595.0343

www.DeTommasoLawGroup.com

This message is a confidential communication for the exclusive use of the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me immediately and erase this message.

If you are not a client of the DeTommaso Law Group, this message is neither intended to constitute legal advice nor to establish an attorney-client relationship. If you have not signed a retainer agreement with this firm and fulfilled the conditions thereof, we are not your attorneys and we do not represent you in any capacity.

Original Message

Original Message------

The understanding I have, based on other discussions here and watching the legislation as it evolved, is that the new statute was not intended to make any substantive change to the law on emancipation -- the "sphere of influence" test remains, with a presumption of emancipation and support termination at 18, rebutted by the "child" being a full-time student or disabled (with SSA determination as to disability creating a strong presumption).

My understanding of the purpose of the statute is to address that New Jersey didn't have a presumptive end date for support orders to be terminated. As a result, child support orders would remain open on the AOC's computers until someone got an order closing them. NJ had an inordinate amount of cases where a "child" was now 25 or even 30 and, because no one got an order to terminate support, the case remained open and, most often, arrears were accruing (with no one pursuing them since the parties knew the child was emancipated). Every State's funding from the Federal government is heavily influenced by its collection rate. New Jersey's is relatively poor at #16 in spite of our being the 2nd or 3rd wealthiest state with the 3rd or 4th lowest unemployment (anyone interested in the actual numbers / ranking, see chart as Exhibit Y with Motion for Summary Judgment on http://dpdlaw.com/kavadas.htm#4 ). There are other reasons. New Jersey hasn't reviewed and updated its enforcement procedures and policies since 1998 - although there's a bill pending to do so that we should all support - http://www.dpdlaw.com/cs.htm . States with the most recent revisions and "more carrot, less stick" job-training and similar programs have the highest collection rates, but our being the only state that left orders open forever was one big one. This is why the AOC went all-out in supporting the bill.

With the new statute, cases will administratively close when a child turns 19 unless the custodial parent gets an order continuing it. But it wasn't intended to change either the emancipation age nor the criteria for an over-18 child to remain entitled to support.

There's a lot of confusion about this. In the Turkeimer v. Burke case that Jenny Berse posted, there's a footnote saying "[FN2] ...N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 was enacted to create an automatic termination of support when a child reaches the age of nineteen." (I'm aware of the FN as this was my case on appeal and I'd read the opinion before today). I don't think that's correct either (but it was dicta; irrelevant to the Appellate decision). If it would help anyone working on the issue, the level of "disability" that Judge Flynn found to be insufficient to continue support ("social anxiety disorder" and an IEP) is set out in the briefs on the case -- http://www.dpdlaw.com/appeals.htm#Burke .

Neither do I think its correct to say that support now continues to 19 rather than "over 18 and beyond the sphere of influence" as per the below case law. The NJ Supreme Court's opinion in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982) sets out 18 as the age a child is responsible for himself/herself. A lot of States have overturned laws requiring support beyond 18. At what point can a court no longer require support - what's the Constitutional limit? I'm about as far Left as anyone, but don't think a court can or should say "well, your neighbor (or parent or friend or whatever) needs some money to get by, so you'll be providing that." The Federal government (for purposes of continuing benefits for a "child") says a "child" is no longer a "child" when 18 and out of high school.

Anyway, to answer the original question - I think the statute doesn't change the substantive law, just the procedure for closing cases. Over 18, the presumption of emancipation remains, and can be rebutted by (a) full time student status, or (b) disability, with SSA determination or lack thereof creating a strong presumption (btw, in another case I was involved in, the App Div just reversed a judge who under-appreciated the significance of an SSA determination when he said a party who had been declared disabled was also required to produce medical records or an expert - Corrello v. Corrello, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17860799217562533108 . App Div disagreed.).

I hope someone is covering / discussing this issue at the symposium on Saturday.

David Perry Davis, Esq.
----------------------------------------------------
www.FamilyLawNJ.pro
----------------------------------------------------
112 West Franklin Avenue
Pennington, NJ 08534
Voice: 609-737-2222
Fax: 609-737-3222

TAMMY McGARRIGAN, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN McGARRIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. A-1930-14T1.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted August 23, 2016.
Decided January 3, 2017.

. . .
Our analysis begins with the principle that "parents are expected to support their children until they are emancipated, regardless of whether the children live with one, both, or neither parent." Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super. 29, 39 (App. Div. 2004)). Children are emancipated when they have moved "beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtain[] an independent status of [their] own." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598 (Ch. Div. 1995)). This fact-sensitive evaluation must include consideration of issues such as the "child's need, interests, and independent resources, the family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial ability, among other things." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 2006). See also Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982).

When a child has reached the age of eighteen, the child is presumed to be emancipated, N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, but the presumption is not conclusive. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. Consequently, if a child has reached age eighteen, the person seeking to have parental support continue has the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption. Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div. 2015); Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308.

A well-established instance defeating a request for emancipation and requiring continued support occurs when a custodial parent proves the child remains a full-time student. Limpert v. Limpert, 119 N.J. Super. 438, 442-43 (App. Div. 1972). When a dependent child is enrolled in a full-time educational program, child support must continue. See Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 542 (2006) ("The Legislature and our courts have long recognized a child's need for higher education and that this need is a proper consideration in determining a parent's child support obligation"); Patetta v. Patetta, 358 N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 2003) (stating "while parents are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his or her enrollment in a full-time educational program has been held to require continued support").

7. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

Robert E. Goldstein

Posted 01-25-2017 10:40 AM

http://www.njchildsupport.org/Services-Programs/Custodial-Parents/Termination/Termination-FAQs.aspx#basics1

This sets forth the position of the State regarding this issue

Robert E. Goldstein, Esq.
Drescher & Cheslow, P.A.

610 Bridge Plaza Drive

Manalapan, NJ 07726

(732) 972-1600
Fax (732) 972-0038
E-mail: [email protected]

Visit my personal website: www.mydivorcelawyernj.com

Member, Middlesex County Bar Association, Monmouth Bar Association, New Jersey Association for Justice and New Jersey State Bar Association

IRS Circular 230 Notice: To ensure compliance with certain regulations promulgated by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, we inform you that any federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of (1) avoiding tax-related penalties under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, or (2) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any tax-related matters addressed herein, unless expressly stated otherwise.

This E-Mail message and any documents accompanying this E-Mail transmission contain information from the law firm of Drescher & Cheslow, P.A. which is "Privileged and confidential attorney-client communication and/or work product of counsel." If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution and/or the taking of or refraining from taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this E-Mail information is strictly prohibited and may result in legal action being instituted against you. Please reply to the sender advising of the error in transmission and delete the message and any accompanying documents from your system immediately. Thank you

Original Message

Original Message------

While I recognize the apparent intent of the Act, it seems clear that its language has changed the substantive law. I simply do not see how to avoid that result under the statute's plain language.

The statute refers directly to "termination of [the] obligation to pay child support," not something akin to "termination of enforcement of support obligations by the Probation Division." It specifically mandates that the obligation to pay child support "shall not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age." There is nothing in preexisting case law that would support such a bright line rule. It appears that child support thereafter is expressly disallowed unless designated some other form of financial maintenance under subsection (e)(1). A child over 23 years of age may seek a court order requiring payment of other forms of maintenance or reimbursement as authorized by law provided that the payments are "not payable or enforceable as child support." (Emphasis added). If the statute was intended to be limited to procedural matters and collection, it could easily have been drafted in that manner. It was not.

There is even a provision under 2A:17-56.71(d) preventing parties from "consenting to a specific termination date for child support" if that date "exceed[s] the date a child reaches 23 years of age." Thereafter, parties can consent to "financial arrangements" only if those arrangements are not "designated as child support." Previously, that was not the case.

These are substantive, not procedural, changes.

Statements issued alongside the bill clearly refer to the termination of the obligation to pay child support. (Emancipation language was removed because "the bill's provisions relate only to the obligation to pay child support, and not to other parental duties, rights, and responsibilities. As amended, nothing in the bill would affect the authority of the court to make judicial determinations regarding the legal emancipation of a child.") Thus, emancipation law remains the same and will continue to be governed by the "sphere of influence" test, but the law governing termination of child support has been radically reshaped.

Floor statements for S1046:

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S1.PDF

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S2.PDF

Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(1), read in conjunction, establish a more rigid test, without making any reference to the "sphere of influence," that governs whether a child may remain entitled to child support between the ages of 19 and 23. It's nevertheless plausible that subsection (b)(1) will be construed as procedural. Without doubt, however, the bright-line rule of termination at 23 is new and different.

Very truly yours,

Andrew

---

ANDREW M. SHAW, ESQ.

Divorce & Family Attorney

DeTommaso Law Group, LLC
73 Grove Street | Somerville, NJ 08876

t: 908.595.0340 | f: 908.595.0343

www.DeTommasoLawGroup.com

This message is a confidential communication for the exclusive use of the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me immediately and erase this message.

If you are not a client of the DeTommaso Law Group, this message is neither intended to constitute legal advice nor to establish an attorney-client relationship. If you have not signed a retainer agreement with this firm and fulfilled the conditions thereof, we are not your attorneys and we do not represent you in any capacity.

8. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

Adam Eisenhut, Esq

Posted 02-06-2017 05:34 PM

One of my clients just received one of the first salvo of the "child support termination" letters from Probation pursuant to the new statute. Their notice indicated that support in their case was "unallocated" and as such would NOT be reduced when one of her three children turned 19. I spoke to someone at Probation and was told that unless a Court specifically allocated an amount of support per child Probation will treat the entire support amount as "unallocated" and that a payor will not get any automatic reduction of their support upon the emancipation of one of their children. I have never seen a Judge allocated support between children when there are multiple children all under the Guidelines as doing so would require running multiple sets of Guidelines.

So, if you have a payor with just one child their support will automatically terminate (assuming the recipient of support does not request a continuation upon receiving the termination letter from Probation). However, if you have a payor who is has an obligation for multiple children they will almost never receive any automatic reduction. Probation is not re-running Child Support Guidelines for the remaining unemancipated children and they are not scheduling the case to appear before a Hearing Officer to reduce support. I was surprised by this result, as I thought the statute would be doing more to help payors. It looks like they will still need to file a motion, so I thought I would pass it along.

Adam Eisenhut, Esq.

Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as Matrimonial Law Attorney

Collaboratively Trained Divorce Attorney

Trained Divorce Mediator

Nadine Maleski, LLC
169 Main Street
Flemington, NJ 08822
Telephone 908-237-9711

Facsimile 908-237-9697

Nadine Maleski, Esq., Certified by the Supreme Court as a Family Law Attorney.

The information contained in this e-mail message is intended only for the confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. This message is privileged and confidential. If the receiver of this message is not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by e-mail, and delete the original message.

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Original Message

Original Message------

While I recognize the apparent intent of the Act, it seems clear that its language has changed the substantive law. I simply do not see how to avoid that result under the statute's plain language.

The statute refers directly to "termination of [the] obligation to pay child support," not something akin to "termination of enforcement of support obligations by the Probation Division." It specifically mandates that the obligation to pay child support "shall not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age." There is nothing in preexisting case law that would support such a bright line rule. It appears that child support thereafter is expressly disallowed unless designated some other form of financial maintenance under subsection (e)(1). A child over 23 years of age may seek a court order requiring payment of other forms of maintenance or reimbursement as authorized by law provided that the payments are "not payable or enforceable as child support." (Emphasis added). If the statute was intended to be limited to procedural matters and collection, it could easily have been drafted in that manner. It was not.

There is even a provision under 2A:17-56.71(d) preventing parties from "consenting to a specific termination date for child support" if that date "exceed[s] the date a child reaches 23 years of age." Thereafter, parties can consent to "financial arrangements" only if those arrangements are not "designated as child support." Previously, that was not the case.

These are substantive, not procedural, changes.

Statements issued alongside the bill clearly refer to the termination of the obligation to pay child support. (Emancipation language was removed because "the bill's provisions relate only to the obligation to pay child support, and not to other parental duties, rights, and responsibilities. As amended, nothing in the bill would affect the authority of the court to make judicial determinations regarding the legal emancipation of a child.") Thus, emancipation law remains the same and will continue to be governed by the "sphere of influence" test, but the law governing termination of child support has been radically reshaped.

Floor statements for S1046:

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S1.PDF

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S2.PDF

Subsections (a)(2) and (b)(1), read in conjunction, establish a more rigid test, without making any reference to the "sphere of influence," that governs whether a child may remain entitled to child support between the ages of 19 and 23. It's nevertheless plausible that subsection (b)(1) will be construed as procedural. Without doubt, however, the bright-line rule of termination at 23 is new and different.

Very truly yours,

Andrew

---

ANDREW M. SHAW, ESQ.

Divorce & Family Attorney

DeTommaso Law Group, LLC
73 Grove Street | Somerville, NJ 08876

t: 908.595.0340 | f: 908.595.0343

www.DeTommasoLawGroup.com

This message is a confidential communication for the exclusive use of the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me immediately and erase this message.

If you are not a client of the DeTommaso Law Group, this message is neither intended to constitute legal advice nor to establish an attorney-client relationship. If you have not signed a retainer agreement with this firm and fulfilled the conditions thereof, we are not your attorneys and we do not represent you in any capacity.

9. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

Alice M. Plastoris, Esq

Posted 02-06-2017 05:50 PM

No the statute specifically says that the support will not be reduced automatically with an emancipation if there are more children because it is unallocated. for example, if you have 3 children it is not a straight 1/3 per child under the guidelines as you know. Probation does not re-fun guidelines or schedule a hearing. The payor client should make an application to reduce child support based on the emanicipation to be calculated under the law whether it is guidelines or case law based on the ages of the children.

Alice M. Plastoris, Esq.

Law Office of Alice M. Plastoris, Esq.

82 Speedwell Avenue, 2nd Floor

Morristown, NJ 07960

Telephone No. (973) 538-7070

Fax No. (973) 538-7088

Email: [email protected]

***EMAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*** The information contained in this electronic message may contain attorney-client privileged and confidential information intended only for the use of the owner of the email address listed as the recipient of this message. If you are not the intended recipient of this email message, you are hereby notified that any disclosure dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, plesae notify the sender by return email, and by telephone at (973) 538-7070.

Original Message

Original Message------

One of my clients just received one of the first salvo of the "child support termination" letters from Probation pursuant to the new statute. Their notice indicated that support in their case was "unallocated" and as such would NOT be reduced when one of her three children turned 19. I spoke to someone at Probation and was told that unless a Court specifically allocated an amount of support per child Probation will treat the entire support amount as "unallocated" and that a payor will not get any automatic reduction of their support upon the emancipation of one of their children. I have never seen a Judge allocated support between children when there are multiple children all under the Guidelines as doing so would require running multiple sets of Guidelines.

So, if you have a payor with just one child their support will automatically terminate (assuming the recipient of support does not request a continuation upon receiving the termination letter from Probation). However, if you have a payor who is has an obligation for multiple children they will almost never receive any automatic reduction. Probation is not re-running Child Support Guidelines for the remaining unemancipated children and they are not scheduling the case to appear before a Hearing Officer to reduce support. I was surprised by this result, as I thought the statute would be doing more to help payors. It looks like they will still need to file a motion, so I thought I would pass it along.

Adam Eisenhut, Esq.

Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as Matrimonial Law Attorney

Collaboratively Trained Divorce Attorney

Trained Divorce Mediator

Nadine Maleski, LLC
169 Main Street
Flemington, NJ 08822
Telephone 908-237-9711

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10. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

Maggi Khalil Maksoud

Posted 01-25-2017 05:48 PM

Hi David,

You mentioned Kavadas. What is going on with that case? Please update us and thank you for your efforts.

Regards,

Maggi

------------------------------
Maggi Khalil Maksoud, Esq.
561 Broadway
Bayonne, NJ 07002
Phone: (201) 858-4555
Fax: (201) 858-4599
Website: www.LawOfficeofMKM.com
------------------------------

Original Message

Original Message:
Sent: 01-24-2017 23:44
From: David Perry Davis
Subject: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

The understanding I have, based on other discussions here and watching the legislation as it evolved, is that the new statute was not intended to make any substantive change to the law on emancipation -- the "sphere of influence" test remains, with a presumption of emancipation and support termination at 18, rebutted by the "child" being a full-time student or disabled (with SSA determination as to disability creating a strong presumption).

My understanding of the purpose of the statute is to address that New Jersey didn't have a presumptive end date for support orders to be terminated. As a result, child support orders would remain open on the AOC's computers until someone got an order closing them. NJ had an inordinate amount of cases where a "child" was now 25 or even 30 and, because no one got an order to terminate support, the case remained open and, most often, arrears were accruing (with no one pursuing them since the parties knew the child was emancipated). Every State's funding from the Federal government is heavily influenced by its collection rate. New Jersey's is relatively poor at #16 in spite of our being the 2nd or 3rd wealthiest state with the 3rd or 4th lowest unemployment (anyone interested in the actual numbers / ranking, see chart as Exhibit Y with Motion for Summary Judgment on http://dpdlaw.com/kavadas.htm#4 ). There are other reasons. New Jersey hasn't reviewed and updated its enforcement procedures and policies since 1998 - although there's a bill pending to do so that we should all support - http://www.dpdlaw.com/cs.htm . States with the most recent revisions and "more carrot, less stick" job-training and similar programs have the highest collection rates, but our being the only state that left orders open forever was one big one. This is why the AOC went all-out in supporting the bill.

With the new statute, cases will administratively close when a child turns 19 unless the custodial parent gets an order continuing it. But it wasn't intended to change either the emancipation age nor the criteria for an over-18 child to remain entitled to support.

There's a lot of confusion about this. In the Turkeimer v. Burke case that Jenny Berse posted, there's a footnote saying "[FN2] ...N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 was enacted to create an automatic termination of support when a child reaches the age of nineteen." (I'm aware of the FN as this was my case on appeal and I'd read the opinion before today). I don't think that's correct either (but it was dicta; irrelevant to the Appellate decision). If it would help anyone working on the issue, the level of "disability" that Judge Flynn found to be insufficient to continue support ("social anxiety disorder" and an IEP) is set out in the briefs on the case -- http://www.dpdlaw.com/appeals.htm#Burke .

Neither do I think its correct to say that support now continues to 19 rather than "over 18 and beyond the sphere of influence" as per the below case law. The NJ Supreme Court's opinion in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982) sets out 18 as the age a child is responsible for himself/herself. A lot of States have overturned laws requiring support beyond 18. At what point can a court no longer require support - what's the Constitutional limit? I'm about as far Left as anyone, but don't think a court can or should say "well, your neighbor (or parent or friend or whatever) needs some money to get by, so you'll be providing that." The Federal government (for purposes of continuing benefits for a "child") says a "child" is no longer a "child" when 18 and out of high school.

Anyway, to answer the original question - I think the statute doesn't change the substantive law, just the procedure for closing cases. Over 18, the presumption of emancipation remains, and can be rebutted by (a) full time student status, or (b) disability, with SSA determination or lack thereof creating a strong presumption (btw, in another case I was involved in, the App Div just reversed a judge who under-appreciated the significance of an SSA determination when he said a party who had been declared disabled was also required to produce medical records or an expert - Corrello v. Corrello, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17860799217562533108 . App Div disagreed.).

I hope someone is covering / discussing this issue at the symposium on Saturday.

David Perry Davis, Esq.
----------------------------------------------------
www.FamilyLawNJ.pro
----------------------------------------------------
112 West Franklin Avenue
Pennington, NJ 08534
Voice: 609-737-2222
Fax: 609-737-3222

TAMMY McGARRIGAN, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN McGARRIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. A-1930-14T1.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted August 23, 2016.
Decided January 3, 2017.

. . .
Our analysis begins with the principle that "parents are expected to support their children until they are emancipated, regardless of whether the children live with one, both, or neither parent." Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super. 29, 39 (App. Div. 2004)). Children are emancipated when they have moved "beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtain[] an independent status of [their] own." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598 (Ch. Div. 1995)). This fact-sensitive evaluation must include consideration of issues such as the "child's need, interests, and independent resources, the family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial ability, among other things." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 2006). See also Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982).

When a child has reached the age of eighteen, the child is presumed to be emancipated, N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, but the presumption is not conclusive. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. Consequently, if a child has reached age eighteen, the person seeking to have parental support continue has the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption. Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div. 2015); Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308.

A well-established instance defeating a request for emancipation and requiring continued support occurs when a custodial parent proves the child remains a full-time student. Limpert v. Limpert, 119 N.J. Super. 438, 442-43 (App. Div. 1972). When a dependent child is enrolled in a full-time educational program, child support must continue. See Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 542 (2006) ("The Legislature and our courts have long recognized a child's need for higher education and that this need is a proper consideration in determining a parent's child support obligation"); Patetta v. Patetta, 358 N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 2003) (stating "while parents are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his or her enrollment in a full-time educational program has been held to require continued support").

11. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

David Perry Davis, Esq

Posted 01-25-2017 06:58 PM

Updates are posted on the website for the case - http://dpdlaw.com/kavadas.htm#Top . There's a free site you can sign up for that will report to you if there are changes on any website ( https://visualping.io/ ), but I post around whenever something big happens.

Oral argument was on August 23. That's 155 days ago, but I am far from complaining. The consensus seems to be that denying everything would have been a lot quicker task - obviously, the delay is no guarentee that we'll at least partially prevail, but I'd always rather get something that's well reasoned. Only downside is that the current counterproductive system is hurting a lot of people (ultimately the kids who receive support pay when licenses are taken automatically without a showing this extreme action would help rather than hurt).

Only other update is that the audio from oral argument is on the website and we now have updated stats (NJ slipped from 16 to 18th place in collections).

I'll keep everyone posted. Thanks for asking.

<x-sigsep>

David Perry Davis, Esq.
------------------------------------------
www.FamilyLawNJ.pro
------------------------------------------
112 West Franklin Avenue
Pennington, NJ 08534
Voice: 609-737-2222
Fax: 609-737-3222

</x-sigsep>

Original Message

12. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

David Perry Davis, Esq

Posted 02-23-2017 12:55 AM

Well, that didn't take long.

I'm filing a motion to emancipate a child who turned 18 in June 2016 and dropped out of college and so am working on a letter brief and zeroing in on the new statute NJ Rev Stat § 2A:17-56.67 (2015) . In the prior discussions, I don't think the relevant language was quoted / highlighted:
<x-tab>        </x-tab><x-tab>        </x-tab>... a child support obligation shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless...

With emphasis on the important words:
<x-tab>        </x-tab><x-tab>        </x-tab>... a child support obligation shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless...

I think Newburg (Gac, etc) with the presumption of emancipation / end of support duty occurring at 18 unless the child is disabled or a full-time student survives this. The emphasized words above make it plain that, under the new statute, support ends "by operation of law" and "without order by the court" at 19.

That doesn't mean the Supreme Court decision in Newburg (which cites to numerous statutes controlling when a "child" becomes an "adult") is gone -- it just shifts the burden, requiring an "order of the court" to end it. 18 and out of school and not disabled, the burden is on the parent seeking to end child support to file a motion and to obtain the aforementioned "order of the court." If they don't do so, the obligation will then "terminate by operation of law without order by the court" at 19.

Support for this:

1. All the reasoning of the aforementioned case law focusing on when a child is a legal adult and therefore presumptively self-supporting. See the above-mentioned law and Ort v. Ort, 428 N.J.Super. 290, 296-97, 52 A.3d 1072 (Ch.Div.2012) (reviewing many statutes defining who is and isn't an adult).

2. The NJ Supreme Court holding in many cases that "in the absence of a clear manifestation to the contrary, we shall not impute to the Legislature an intention to change established law." Oches v. Twp. of Middletown Police Dep't, 155 N.J. 1, 5, 713 A.2d 993 (1998) citing State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 512, 432 A.2d 74 (1981) <x-tab>       </x-tab>....   Newburg has been the law since 1982, affirmed and reaffirmed many times.

3. Were this reading of the intent inaccurate, wouldn't the phrase "by operation of law without order by the court" be superfluous? What other meaning would "without order by the court" mean? Again to statutory construction language (the many many hours of briefing statutory construction issues for http://dpdlaw.com/kavadas.htm is coming in handy...): "Courts should try to give effect to every word of the statute, and should not assume that the Legislature used meaningless language. Nor should we construe the statute to render part of it superfluous.'" Green v. Auerbach Chevrolet Corp., 127 N.J. 591, 598 (1992) (quoting Medical Soc'y of New Jersey v. New Jersey Dep't of Law and Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26-27 (1990)). If the legislature simply wanted to extend the date for emancipation to age 19, why not just say "... a child support obligation shall terminate when a child reaches 19 years of age unless..."?

If it's unclear, a review of the Senate and Assembly Committee statements support this interpretation (see below), saying, for example "This bill clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law." That's not the same thing as "This bill clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support would terminate." (i.e., no "by operation of law." included).

Before I file, I want to also look at the testimony supplied by the AOC / DFD as to the bill, which I'm pretty sure focuses on the effect on the collection rate and that the bottom line -- increasing the collection rate by removing "dead" cases -- would result in a significant increase in NJ's federal funding.

Anyone think this is wrong? If so, why?

<x-sigsep>

David Perry Davis, Esq.
----------------------------------------------------
   www.FamilyLawNJ.pro
----------------------------------------------------
112 West Franklin Avenue
Pennington, NJ 08534
Voice: 609-737-2222
Fax:    609-737-3222

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_I1.HTM

SENATE, No. 1046
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
216th LEGISLATURE
INTRODUCED JANUARY 30, 2014
Sponsored by:
Senator SHIRLEY K. TURNER
District 15 (Hunterdon and Mercer)
Senator NICHOLAS P. SCUTARI
District 22 (Middlesex, Somerset and Union)
SYNOPSIS
     Concerns alterations in child support obligations in response to changes to status of supported child.

CURRENT VERSION OF TEXT
     As introduced.

An Act concerning child support and supplementing chapter 17 of Title 2A of the New Jersey Statutes.

     Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:
     1.    a. Unless otherwise provided in a court order or judgment, the obligation to pay child support shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court on the date that a child who is less than 19 years of age marries, dies, or enters the military service. A child support obligation shall also terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless:
     (1)   another age for the termination of the obligation to pay child support is specified in a court order;
     (2)   the parents of the child consent and the court approves the continuation of support until another predetermined date; or
     (3)   the court extends the obligation to pay child support based on an application by a parent or the child filed prior to the child attaining the age of 19.
     b.    A parent or child may petition the court for the continuation of child support beyond 19 years of age in the following circumstances:
     (1)   the child is still enrolled in high school or other secondary educational program;
     (2)   the child is participating full-time in a post-secondary education program;
     (3)   the child has a physical or mental disability that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19 and requires continued support; or
     (4)   other exceptional circumstances as may be approved by the court.
     c.    If the court grants an order for the continuation of the obligation to pay child support, it shall include in its order a future date upon which the child support obligation will terminate or a date upon which the court will review the circumstances of the parties and children.
     d.    For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, no less than 90 days prior to the termination of child support pursuant to this section the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency shall cooperatively provide both parents with at least one notice of a proposed termination, which shall include instructions for seeking the continuation of child support in appropriate circumstances.

     2.    a. Whenever there is an unallocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law pursuant to section 1 of P.L.    , c.       (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill), the amount of the child support obligation in effect immediately prior to the date of the termination shall remain in effect for the other children until the court subsequently modifies the child support amount. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining child support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children. For the purposes of this section, unallocated means a child support amount for the benefit of multiple children that does not specify the amount of support for each child.
     b.    Whenever there is an allocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law pursuant to section 1 of P.L.    , c.   (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill), the amount of the child support obligation shall be adjusted to reflect only the amount allotted for the remaining child or children. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children. For the purposes of this section, allocated means a child support amount for the benefit of multiple children that specifies the amount of support for each child as ordered by the court.

     3.    If a child support obligation is terminated by operation of law pursuant to section 1 of P.L.    , c.       (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill), any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the termination shall remain due and enforceable. If the person responsible for paying support for a child owes child support arrearages at the time a support obligation is terminated and there are no other children being supported under the same order, the amount to be paid to satisfy the arrearage shall be the sum of the recurring child support obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination plus any arrears repayment obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
     For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, the Probation Division shall continue to enforce and collect the arrearages until they are paid in full or the court, in accordance with State and federal law and regulations and the Rules of Court, as applicable, terminates the Probation Division's supervision of the support order.

     4.    The provisions of P.L.    , c.       (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill) shall not apply to child support provisions contained in orders or judgments entered by a foreign jurisdiction and registered in New Jersey for modification or enforcement pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, P.L.1998, c.2 (C.2A:4-30.65 et seq.), or a law or procedure substantially similar to the "Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act," originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1952, c.197 (C.2A:4-30.1 et seq.) but subsequently repealed, or the "Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act," originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1981, c.243 (C.2A:4-30.24 et seq.) but also subsequently repealed.

     5.    Nothing in P.L.    , c.   (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill) shall:
     a.    require or relieve a parent from paying support or other costs while a child is enrolled full-time in a post-secondary education program;
     b.    prohibit the State IV-D agency or the Probation Division of the Superior Court from seeking to close a Title IV-D case or terminate its supervision of a child support order in accordance with procedures as provided under State or federal law and regulations or the Rules of Court;
     c.    prohibit any party from filing an application with the court seeking the termination of an order to pay child support for any cause other than those provided under P.L.    , c.   (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill); or
     d.    prohibit the parties from consenting to a specific termination date subject to the approval of the court.

     6.    The Supreme Court may adopt Rules of Court appropriate or necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act.

     7.    The Commissioner of Human Services may adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) to effectuate the purposes of this act.

     8.    This act shall take effect 180 days after enactment and shall be applicable to all child support orders issued prior to, on, or after the effective date.

STATEMENT

     The bill clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support terminates and provides that such termination would occur by operation of law.
Termination of child support
     Specifically, the bill provides that, unless otherwise provided in a court order or judgment, the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law without order by the court on the date that a child who is less than 19 years of age marries, dies, or enters the military service. A child support obligation would also terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless:
     (1)   another age for the termination of the obligation to pay child support is specified in a court order;
     (2)   the parents of the child consent and the court approves the continuation of support until another predetermined date; or
     (3)   the court extends the obligation to pay child support based on an application by a parent or the child filed prior to the child attaining the age of 19.
Continuation beyond age 19
     The bill provides that a parent or child may petition the court for the continuation of child support beyond age 19 in the following circumstances:
     (1)   the child is still enrolled in high school or other secondary educational program;
     (2)   the child is participating full-time in a post-secondary education program;
     (3)   the child has a physical or mental disability that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19 and requires continued support; or
     (4)   other exceptional circumstances as may be approved by the court.
     Under the bill, if the court grants an order for the continuation of the obligation to pay child support, it would include in its order a future date upon which the child support obligation will terminate or a date upon which the court will review the circumstances of the parties and children.
Orders supervised by Probation Division
     Pursuant to the provisions of the bill, for support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court no less than 90 days prior to the termination of child support, the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency (Department of Human Services) would be required to cooperatively provide both parents with at least one notice of a proposed termination, which would include instructions for seeking the continuation of child support in appropriate circumstances.
Unallocated Child Support Orders
     The bill provides that whenever there is an unallocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law, the amount of the obligation in effect immediately prior to the date of the termination would remain in effect for the other children until the court subsequently modifies the child support amount. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining child support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children. As defined in the bill "unallocated" means a child support order amount for the benefit of multiple children that does not specify the amount of support for each child.
Allocated Child Support Orders
     Pursuant to the provisions of the bill, whenever there is an allocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law, the amount of the child support obligation would be adjusted to reflect only the amount allotted for the remaining child or children. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children.
Arrearages
     The bill provides that if a child support obligation is terminated pursuant to its provisions, any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the termination would remain due and enforceable. If the person responsible for paying support for a child owes child support arrearages at the time a support obligation is terminated and there are no other children being supported under the same order, the amount to be paid to satisfy the arrearage would be the sum of the recurring child support obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination plus any arrears repayment obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
     For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, the Probation Division would continue to enforce and collect the arrearages until they are paid in full or until the court, in accordance with State and federal law and regulations and the Rules of Court, as applicable, terminates the Probation Division's supervision of the support order.
Orders entered by other jurisdictions
     The bill would not apply to child support provisions contained in orders or judgments entered by a foreign jurisdiction and registered in New Jersey for modification or enforcement pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, P.L.1998, c.2 (C.2A:4-30.65 et seq.), or a law or procedure substantially similar to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1952, c.197 (C.2A:4-30.1 et seq.) but subsequently repealed, or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1981, c.243 (C.2A:4-30.24 et seq.) but also subsequently repealed.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S3.HTM
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
STATEMENT TO
SENATE, No. 1046
with committee amendments
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DATED: MARCH 24, 2014
      The Senate Judiciary Committee reports favorably and with committee amendments Senate Bill No. 1046.
      This bill, as amended, clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support terminates and provides that such termination would occur by operation of law.
Termination of child support
      Specifically, the bill provides that, unless otherwise provided in a court order or judgment, the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law without order by the court on the date that a child who is less than 19 years of age marries, dies, or enters the military service. A child support obligation would also terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless:
      (1) another age for the termination of the obligation to pay child support is specified in a court order;
      (2) the parents of the child consent and the court approves the continuation of support until another predetermined date;
      (3) the court extends the obligation to pay child support based on an application by a parent or guardian filed prior to the child attaining the age of 19; or
      (4) the child receiving support is in an out-of-home placement through the Division of Child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families.
Continuation beyond age 19
      The bill provides that a parent or guardian may submit a written request to the court with supporting documentation, including a projected future date when support will terminate, if appropriate, seeking the continuation of child support beyond age 19 in the following circumstances:
      (1) the child is still enrolled in high school or other secondary educational program;
      (2) the child is participating full-time in a post-secondary education program;
      (3) the child has a physical or mental disability that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19 and requires continued support; or
      (4) other exceptional circumstances as may be approved by the court.
      Under the bill, if the court orders the continuation of the obligation to pay child support based on the written request of the parent or guardian, it would include in its order a future date upon which the child support obligation will terminate or a date upon which the court will review the circumstances of the parties and children. A notice of the continuation of the obligation and the future termination date, when ordered, would be provided to the parties.
Orders supervised by Probation Division
      For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, no less than 90 days prior to the termination of child support, the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency (Department of Human Services) would be required to cooperatively provide both parents with at least one notice of a proposed termination, which would include instructions for seeking the continuation of child support in appropriate circumstances.
Unallocated Child Support Orders
      The bill provides that whenever there is an unallocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law, the amount of the obligation in effect immediately prior to the date of the termination would remain in effect for the other child or children until the court subsequently modifies the child support amount. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining child support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children.
Allocated Child Support Orders
      Pursuant to the provisions of the bill, whenever there is an allocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law, the amount of the child support obligation would be adjusted to reflect only the amount allotted for the remaining child or children. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children.
Arrearages
      The bill provides that if a child support obligation is terminated pursuant to its provisions, any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the termination would remain due and enforceable. If the person responsible for paying support for a child owes child support arrearages at the time a support obligation is terminated and there are no other children being supported under the same order, the amount to be paid to satisfy the arrearage would be the sum of the recurring child support obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination plus any arrears repayment obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
      For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, the Probation Division would continue to enforce and collect the arrearages until they are paid in full or until the court, in accordance with State and federal law and regulations and the Rules of Court, as applicable, terminates the Probation Division's supervision of the support order.
Orders entered by other jurisdictions
      The bill would not apply to child support provisions contained in orders or judgments entered by a foreign jurisdiction and registered in New Jersey for modification or enforcement pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, P.L.1998, c.2 (C.2A:4-30.65 et seq.), or a law or procedure substantially similar to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1952, c.197 (C.2A:4-30.1 et seq.) but subsequently repealed, or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1981, c.243 (C.2A:4-30.24 et seq.) but also subsequently repealed.
Committee Amendments
      The committee amendments to the bill:
      - add an additional exception to the bills default standard that child support terminates when a child reaches age 19, which provides that child support would not terminate if the child is in an out-of-home placement through the Division of Child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families;
      - remove language stating that a child could file a petition with the court concerning obligations to pay child support;
      - provide instead that a parent or guardian may submit a written request to the court with supporting documentation, including a projected future date when support will terminate, if appropriate, seeking the continuation of child support beyond 19 years of age;
      - clarify that any order for continuation of the obligation to pay child support beyond age 19 would be based on the written request of the parent or guardian;
      - add a provision that a notice of the continuation of the obligation and the future termination date, when ordered, would be provided to the parties; and
      - add a provision specifying that nothing in the bill would be construed to prevent a parent or guardian responsible for paying child support from petitioning the court for the termination of child support or for emancipation of a child prior to the age of 19 for good cause, or from petitioning the court to contest the extension of child support beyond the age of 19 as provided in the bill.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S2.HTM

STATEMENT TO
[First Reprint]
SENATE, No. 1046
with Senate Floor Amendments
(Proposed by Senator TURNER)
ADOPTED: DECEMBER 18, 2014
      These floor amendments make several changes to the provisions of the underlying bill, which clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law, with exceptions for extending support until a child reaches, at a maximum, 23 years of age.
      These changes include:
      - requiring two notices of proposed termination of child support when a child reaches 19 years of age (the general default for termination), for any support orders administered by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, cooperatively provided to both parents by the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency. The first notice would be sent at least 180 days prior to the proposed termination date, and the second at least 90 days prior thereto;
      - clarifying references to custodial parent (instead of parent or guardian), as being the party responsible for seeking the continuation of child support when such support is scheduled to terminate;
      - providing for the continuation of child support beyond a child reaching 19 years of age, based on an application to the court following notice of child support termination, when a child is a student in a post-secondary education program and enrolled for the number of hours or courses the school considers to be full-time attendance during some part of each of any five calendar months of the year;
      - providing for the continuation of child support beyond a child reaching 19 years of age, based on an application to the court following notice of child support termination, due to the child having a physical or mental disability, as determined by a federal or State governmental agency, that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19;
      - providing for the continuation of child support, based on an application to the court not tied to any termination notice, due to exceptional circumstances as may be approved by the court;
      - indicating the courts authority to continue child support beyond the date a child reaches 19 years of age upon a custodial parents application, based upon the parent establishing sufficient proof for such continuation using the continuation request form, as promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts, and other supporting documentation submitted to the court;
      - indicating that a parent responsible for paying child support who disagrees with the courts decision to continue child support may, at any time, file a motion seeking relief from that obligation;
      - providing for the termination of child support without court order on the date that a child, regardless of age, marries, dies, or enters the military service;
      - providing for the termination of child support on a date after a child reaches 19 years of age, as specified by court order, but which date would not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age;
      - establishing that, notwithstanding the bills provisions for child support continuation, the obligation to pay child support terminates when a child reaches 23 years of age, but nothing prevents the payment of an alternate form of financial support or reimbursement from a parent for that child;
      - clarifying references throughout the bill to child support in order to demonstrate that the bill exclusively addresses this and not other alternative forms of financial support; and
      - including, in the bills effective date section, a delayed effective date of the first day of the 13th month following enactment, and indicating that the Administrative Office of the Courts and the Department of Human Services (the State IV-D agency) would cooperate to take any anticipatory administrative action, including with respect to the termination of child support notices provided in the bill, as needed for the bills implementation.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S1.HTM

STATEMENT TO

[Second Reprint]
SENATE, No. 1046

with Assembly Floor Amendments
(Proposed by Assemblyman GUSCIORA)

ADOPTED: DECEMBER 3, 2015
      This bill clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law.
      Under the bill, the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency would cooperatively provide both parents with at least two notices of a proposed termination of child support, which would include information and the request form to facilitate the continuation of child support beyond the date the child reaches 19 years of age. These floor amendments provide that the two notices would be required to be in writing. In addition, the amendments provide that to the extent feasible the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency would cooperatively provide additional notice to the parents by text message, telephone message, or other electronic means.
      The amendments also remove the reference to the term emancipation in the bill because the bills provisions relate only to the obligation to pay child support, and not to other parental duties, rights, and responsibilities. As amended, nothing in the bill would affect the authority of the court to make judicial determinations regarding the legal emancipation of a child.
      In addition, the amendments require the Administrative Office of the Courts and the State IV-D agency to prepare and make available to the public information            regarding the termination of child support obligations pursuant to the bill, including but not limited to: how parents may establish an alternative termination age or event; how support may be extended beyond the of age 19 under certain circumstances; and how parents may contest the continuation or termination of support as provided in the bill.
      The remaining amendments are technical in nature.

</x-sigsep>

Original Message

Original Message------

The understanding I have, based on other discussions here and watching the legislation as it evolved, is that the new statute was not intended to make any substantive change to the law on emancipation -- the "sphere of influence" test remains, with a presumption of emancipation and support termination at 18, rebutted by the "child" being a full-time student or disabled (with SSA determination as to disability creating a strong presumption).

My understanding of the purpose of the statute is to address that New Jersey didn't have a presumptive end date for support orders to be terminated. As a result, child support orders would remain open on the AOC's computers until someone got an order closing them. NJ had an inordinate amount of cases where a "child" was now 25 or even 30 and, because no one got an order to terminate support, the case remained open and, most often, arrears were accruing (with no one pursuing them since the parties knew the child was emancipated). Every State's funding from the Federal government is heavily influenced by its collection rate. New Jersey's is relatively poor at #16 in spite of our being the 2nd or 3rd wealthiest state with the 3rd or 4th lowest unemployment (anyone interested in the actual numbers / ranking, see chart as Exhibit Y with Motion for Summary Judgment on http://dpdlaw.com/kavadas.htm#4 ). There are other reasons. New Jersey hasn't reviewed and updated its enforcement procedures and policies since 1998 - although there's a bill pending to do so that we should all support - http://www.dpdlaw.com/cs.htm . States with the most recent revisions and "more carrot, less stick" job-training and similar programs have the highest collection rates, but our being the only state that left orders open forever was one big one. This is why the AOC went all-out in supporting the bill.

With the new statute, cases will administratively close when a child turns 19 unless the custodial parent gets an order continuing it. But it wasn't intended to change either the emancipation age nor the criteria for an over-18 child to remain entitled to support.

There's a lot of confusion about this. In the Turkeimer v. Burke case that Jenny Berse posted, there's a footnote saying "[FN2] ...N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 was enacted to create an automatic termination of support when a child reaches the age of nineteen." (I'm aware of the FN as this was my case on appeal and I'd read the opinion before today). I don't think that's correct either (but it was dicta; irrelevant to the Appellate decision). If it would help anyone working on the issue, the level of "disability" that Judge Flynn found to be insufficient to continue support ("social anxiety disorder" and an IEP) is set out in the briefs on the case -- http://www.dpdlaw.com/appeals.htm#Burke .

Neither do I think its correct to say that support now continues to 19 rather than "over 18 and beyond the sphere of influence" as per the below case law. The NJ Supreme Court's opinion in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982) sets out 18 as the age a child is responsible for himself/herself. A lot of States have overturned laws requiring support beyond 18. At what point can a court no longer require support - what's the Constitutional limit? I'm about as far Left as anyone, but don't think a court can or should say "well, your neighbor (or parent or friend or whatever) needs some money to get by, so you'll be providing that." The Federal government (for purposes of continuing benefits for a "child") says a "child" is no longer a "child" when 18 and out of high school.

Anyway, to answer the original question - I think the statute doesn't change the substantive law, just the procedure for closing cases. Over 18, the presumption of emancipation remains, and can be rebutted by (a) full time student status, or (b) disability, with SSA determination or lack thereof creating a strong presumption (btw, in another case I was involved in, the App Div just reversed a judge who under-appreciated the significance of an SSA determination when he said a party who had been declared disabled was also required to produce medical records or an expert - Corrello v. Corrello, https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17860799217562533108 . App Div disagreed.).

I hope someone is covering / discussing this issue at the symposium on Saturday.

David Perry Davis, Esq.
----------------------------------------------------
www.FamilyLawNJ.pro
----------------------------------------------------
112 West Franklin Avenue
Pennington, NJ 08534
Voice: 609-737-2222
Fax: 609-737-3222

TAMMY McGARRIGAN, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN McGARRIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. A-1930-14T1.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted August 23, 2016.
Decided January 3, 2017.

. . .
Our analysis begins with the principle that "parents are expected to support their children until they are emancipated, regardless of whether the children live with one, both, or neither parent." Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super. 29, 39 (App. Div. 2004)). Children are emancipated when they have moved "beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtain[] an independent status of [their] own." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598 (Ch. Div. 1995)). This fact-sensitive evaluation must include consideration of issues such as the "child's need, interests, and independent resources, the family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial ability, among other things." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App. Div. 2006). See also Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982).

When a child has reached the age of eighteen, the child is presumed to be emancipated, N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, but the presumption is not conclusive. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. Consequently, if a child has reached age eighteen, the person seeking to have parental support continue has the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption. Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div. 2015); Filippone, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308.

A well-established instance defeating a request for emancipation and requiring continued support occurs when a custodial parent proves the child remains a full-time student. Limpert v. Limpert, 119 N.J. Super. 438, 442-43 (App. Div. 1972). When a dependent child is enrolled in a full-time educational program, child support must continue. See Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 542 (2006) ("The Legislature and our courts have long recognized a child's need for higher education and that this need is a proper consideration in determining a parent's child support obligation"); Patetta v. Patetta, 358 N.J. Super. 90, 94 (App. Div. 2003) (stating "while parents are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his or her enrollment in a full-time educational program has been held to require continued support").

13. RE: New Child Support Statute as it relates to special needs

Recommend

Angela Barker

Posted 02-24-2017 07:49 AM

What 19 year old child is emancipated...never met that kid...

Angela Barker

Law Office of Angela Barker, LLC

Tel: (646) 415-8883

(201) 336-0352

Fax: (646) 395-9562

Email: [email protected]

Web: www.angelabarkerlaw.com

Original Message

Original Message------

Well, that didn't take long.

I'm filing a motion to emancipate a child who turned 18 in June 2016 and dropped out of college and so am working on a letter brief and zeroing in on the new statute NJ Rev Stat § 2A:17-56.67 (2015) . In the prior discussions, I don't think the relevant language was quoted / highlighted:
<x-tab>        </x-tab><x-tab>        </x-tab>... a child support obligation shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless...

With emphasis on the important words:
<x-tab>        </x-tab><x-tab>        </x-tab>... a child support obligation shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless...

I think Newburg (Gac, etc) with the presumption of emancipation / end of support duty occurring at 18 unless the child is disabled or a full-time student survives this. The emphasized words above make it plain that, under the new statute, support ends "by operation of law" and "without order by the court" at 19.

That doesn't mean the Supreme Court decision in Newburg (which cites to numerous statutes controlling when a "child" becomes an "adult") is gone -- it just shifts the burden, requiring an "order of the court" to end it. 18 and out of school and not disabled, the burden is on the parent seeking to end child support to file a motion and to obtain the aforementioned "order of the court." If they don't do so, the obligation will then "terminate by operation of law without order by the court" at 19.

Support for this:

1. All the reasoning of the aforementioned case law focusing on when a child is a legal adult and therefore presumptively self-supporting. See the above-mentioned law and Ort v. Ort, 428 N.J.Super. 290, 296-97, 52 A.3d 1072 (Ch.Div.2012) (reviewing many statutes defining who is and isn't an adult).

2. The NJ Supreme Court holding in many cases that "in the absence of a clear manifestation to the contrary, we shall not impute to the Legislature an intention to change established law." Oches v. Twp. of Middletown Police Dep't, 155 N.J. 1, 5, 713 A.2d 993 (1998) citing State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 512, 432 A.2d 74 (1981) <x-tab>       </x-tab>....   Newburg has been the law since 1982, affirmed and reaffirmed many times.

3. Were this reading of the intent inaccurate, wouldn't the phrase "by operation of law without order by the court" be superfluous? What other meaning would "without order by the court" mean? Again to statutory construction language (the many many hours of briefing statutory construction issues for http://dpdlaw.com/kavadas.htm is coming in handy...): "Courts should try to give effect to every word of the statute, and should not assume that the Legislature used meaningless language. Nor should we construe the statute to render part of it superfluous.'" Green v. Auerbach Chevrolet Corp., 127 N.J. 591, 598 (1992) (quoting Medical Soc'y of New Jersey v. New Jersey Dep't of Law and Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26-27 (1990)). If the legislature simply wanted to extend the date for emancipation to age 19, why not just say "... a child support obligation shall terminate when a child reaches 19 years of age unless..."?

If it's unclear, a review of the Senate and Assembly Committee statements support this interpretation (see below), saying, for example "This bill clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law." That's not the same thing as "This bill clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support would terminate." (i.e., no "by operation of law." included).

Before I file, I want to also look at the testimony supplied by the AOC / DFD as to the bill, which I'm pretty sure focuses on the effect on the collection rate and that the bottom line -- increasing the collection rate by removing "dead" cases -- would result in a significant increase in NJ's federal funding.

Anyone think this is wrong? If so, why?

<x-sigsep>

David Perry Davis, Esq.
----------------------------------------------------
   www.FamilyLawNJ.pro
----------------------------------------------------
112 West Franklin Avenue
Pennington, NJ 08534
Voice: 609-737-2222
Fax:    609-737-3222

N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_I1.HTM

SENATE, No. 1046
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
216th LEGISLATURE
INTRODUCED JANUARY 30, 2014
Sponsored by:
Senator SHIRLEY K. TURNER
District 15 (Hunterdon and Mercer)
Senator NICHOLAS P. SCUTARI
District 22 (Middlesex, Somerset and Union)
SYNOPSIS
     Concerns alterations in child support obligations in response to changes to status of supported child.

CURRENT VERSION OF TEXT
     As introduced.

An Act concerning child support and supplementing chapter 17 of Title 2A of the New Jersey Statutes.

     Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:
     1.    a. Unless otherwise provided in a court order or judgment, the obligation to pay child support shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court on the date that a child who is less than 19 years of age marries, dies, or enters the military service. A child support obligation shall also terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless:
     (1)   another age for the termination of the obligation to pay child support is specified in a court order;
     (2)   the parents of the child consent and the court approves the continuation of support until another predetermined date; or
     (3)   the court extends the obligation to pay child support based on an application by a parent or the child filed prior to the child attaining the age of 19.
     b.    A parent or child may petition the court for the continuation of child support beyond 19 years of age in the following circumstances:
     (1)   the child is still enrolled in high school or other secondary educational program;
     (2)   the child is participating full-time in a post-secondary education program;
     (3)   the child has a physical or mental disability that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19 and requires continued support; or
     (4)   other exceptional circumstances as may be approved by the court.
     c.    If the court grants an order for the continuation of the obligation to pay child support, it shall include in its order a future date upon which the child support obligation will terminate or a date upon which the court will review the circumstances of the parties and children.
     d.    For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, no less than 90 days prior to the termination of child support pursuant to this section the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency shall cooperatively provide both parents with at least one notice of a proposed termination, which shall include instructions for seeking the continuation of child support in appropriate circumstances.

     2.    a. Whenever there is an unallocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law pursuant to section 1 of P.L.    , c.       (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill), the amount of the child support obligation in effect immediately prior to the date of the termination shall remain in effect for the other children until the court subsequently modifies the child support amount. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining child support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children. For the purposes of this section, unallocated means a child support amount for the benefit of multiple children that does not specify the amount of support for each child.
     b.    Whenever there is an allocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law pursuant to section 1 of P.L.    , c.   (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill), the amount of the child support obligation shall be adjusted to reflect only the amount allotted for the remaining child or children. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children. For the purposes of this section, allocated means a child support amount for the benefit of multiple children that specifies the amount of support for each child as ordered by the court.

     3.    If a child support obligation is terminated by operation of law pursuant to section 1 of P.L.    , c.       (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill), any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the termination shall remain due and enforceable. If the person responsible for paying support for a child owes child support arrearages at the time a support obligation is terminated and there are no other children being supported under the same order, the amount to be paid to satisfy the arrearage shall be the sum of the recurring child support obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination plus any arrears repayment obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
     For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, the Probation Division shall continue to enforce and collect the arrearages until they are paid in full or the court, in accordance with State and federal law and regulations and the Rules of Court, as applicable, terminates the Probation Division's supervision of the support order.

     4.    The provisions of P.L.    , c.       (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill) shall not apply to child support provisions contained in orders or judgments entered by a foreign jurisdiction and registered in New Jersey for modification or enforcement pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, P.L.1998, c.2 (C.2A:4-30.65 et seq.), or a law or procedure substantially similar to the "Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act," originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1952, c.197 (C.2A:4-30.1 et seq.) but subsequently repealed, or the "Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act," originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1981, c.243 (C.2A:4-30.24 et seq.) but also subsequently repealed.

     5.    Nothing in P.L.    , c.   (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill) shall:
     a.    require or relieve a parent from paying support or other costs while a child is enrolled full-time in a post-secondary education program;
     b.    prohibit the State IV-D agency or the Probation Division of the Superior Court from seeking to close a Title IV-D case or terminate its supervision of a child support order in accordance with procedures as provided under State or federal law and regulations or the Rules of Court;
     c.    prohibit any party from filing an application with the court seeking the termination of an order to pay child support for any cause other than those provided under P.L.    , c.   (C.        ) (pending before the Legislature as this bill); or
     d.    prohibit the parties from consenting to a specific termination date subject to the approval of the court.

     6.    The Supreme Court may adopt Rules of Court appropriate or necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act.

     7.    The Commissioner of Human Services may adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) to effectuate the purposes of this act.

     8.    This act shall take effect 180 days after enactment and shall be applicable to all child support orders issued prior to, on, or after the effective date.

STATEMENT

     The bill clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support terminates and provides that such termination would occur by operation of law.
Termination of child support
     Specifically, the bill provides that, unless otherwise provided in a court order or judgment, the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law without order by the court on the date that a child who is less than 19 years of age marries, dies, or enters the military service. A child support obligation would also terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless:
     (1)   another age for the termination of the obligation to pay child support is specified in a court order;
     (2)   the parents of the child consent and the court approves the continuation of support until another predetermined date; or
     (3)   the court extends the obligation to pay child support based on an application by a parent or the child filed prior to the child attaining the age of 19.
Continuation beyond age 19
     The bill provides that a parent or child may petition the court for the continuation of child support beyond age 19 in the following circumstances:
     (1)   the child is still enrolled in high school or other secondary educational program;
     (2)   the child is participating full-time in a post-secondary education program;
     (3)   the child has a physical or mental disability that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19 and requires continued support; or
     (4)   other exceptional circumstances as may be approved by the court.
     Under the bill, if the court grants an order for the continuation of the obligation to pay child support, it would include in its order a future date upon which the child support obligation will terminate or a date upon which the court will review the circumstances of the parties and children.
Orders supervised by Probation Division
     Pursuant to the provisions of the bill, for support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court no less than 90 days prior to the termination of child support, the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency (Department of Human Services) would be required to cooperatively provide both parents with at least one notice of a proposed termination, which would include instructions for seeking the continuation of child support in appropriate circumstances.
Unallocated Child Support Orders
     The bill provides that whenever there is an unallocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law, the amount of the obligation in effect immediately prior to the date of the termination would remain in effect for the other children until the court subsequently modifies the child support amount. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining child support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children. As defined in the bill "unallocated" means a child support order amount for the benefit of multiple children that does not specify the amount of support for each child.
Allocated Child Support Orders
     Pursuant to the provisions of the bill, whenever there is an allocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law, the amount of the child support obligation would be adjusted to reflect only the amount allotted for the remaining child or children. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children.
Arrearages
     The bill provides that if a child support obligation is terminated pursuant to its provisions, any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the termination would remain due and enforceable. If the person responsible for paying support for a child owes child support arrearages at the time a support obligation is terminated and there are no other children being supported under the same order, the amount to be paid to satisfy the arrearage would be the sum of the recurring child support obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination plus any arrears repayment obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
     For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, the Probation Division would continue to enforce and collect the arrearages until they are paid in full or until the court, in accordance with State and federal law and regulations and the Rules of Court, as applicable, terminates the Probation Division's supervision of the support order.
Orders entered by other jurisdictions
     The bill would not apply to child support provisions contained in orders or judgments entered by a foreign jurisdiction and registered in New Jersey for modification or enforcement pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, P.L.1998, c.2 (C.2A:4-30.65 et seq.), or a law or procedure substantially similar to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1952, c.197 (C.2A:4-30.1 et seq.) but subsequently repealed, or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1981, c.243 (C.2A:4-30.24 et seq.) but also subsequently repealed.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S3.HTM
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
STATEMENT TO
SENATE, No. 1046
with committee amendments
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DATED: MARCH 24, 2014
      The Senate Judiciary Committee reports favorably and with committee amendments Senate Bill No. 1046.
      This bill, as amended, clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support terminates and provides that such termination would occur by operation of law.
Termination of child support
      Specifically, the bill provides that, unless otherwise provided in a court order or judgment, the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law without order by the court on the date that a child who is less than 19 years of age marries, dies, or enters the military service. A child support obligation would also terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless:
      (1) another age for the termination of the obligation to pay child support is specified in a court order;
      (2) the parents of the child consent and the court approves the continuation of support until another predetermined date;
      (3) the court extends the obligation to pay child support based on an application by a parent or guardian filed prior to the child attaining the age of 19; or
      (4) the child receiving support is in an out-of-home placement through the Division of Child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families.
Continuation beyond age 19
      The bill provides that a parent or guardian may submit a written request to the court with supporting documentation, including a projected future date when support will terminate, if appropriate, seeking the continuation of child support beyond age 19 in the following circumstances:
      (1) the child is still enrolled in high school or other secondary educational program;
      (2) the child is participating full-time in a post-secondary education program;
      (3) the child has a physical or mental disability that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19 and requires continued support; or
      (4) other exceptional circumstances as may be approved by the court.
      Under the bill, if the court orders the continuation of the obligation to pay child support based on the written request of the parent or guardian, it would include in its order a future date upon which the child support obligation will terminate or a date upon which the court will review the circumstances of the parties and children. A notice of the continuation of the obligation and the future termination date, when ordered, would be provided to the parties.
Orders supervised by Probation Division
      For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, no less than 90 days prior to the termination of child support, the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency (Department of Human Services) would be required to cooperatively provide both parents with at least one notice of a proposed termination, which would include instructions for seeking the continuation of child support in appropriate circumstances.
Unallocated Child Support Orders
      The bill provides that whenever there is an unallocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law, the amount of the obligation in effect immediately prior to the date of the termination would remain in effect for the other child or children until the court subsequently modifies the child support amount. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining child support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children.
Allocated Child Support Orders
      Pursuant to the provisions of the bill, whenever there is an allocated child support order for two or more children and the obligation to pay support for one of the children is terminated by operation of law, the amount of the child support obligation would be adjusted to reflect only the amount allotted for the remaining child or children. Either party may file an application with the court to adjust the remaining support amount to reflect the reduction in the number of dependent children.
Arrearages
      The bill provides that if a child support obligation is terminated pursuant to its provisions, any arrearages that have accrued prior to the date of the termination would remain due and enforceable. If the person responsible for paying support for a child owes child support arrearages at the time a support obligation is terminated and there are no other children being supported under the same order, the amount to be paid to satisfy the arrearage would be the sum of the recurring child support obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination plus any arrears repayment obligation in effect immediately prior to the effective date of the termination, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
      For support orders that are being supervised by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, the Probation Division would continue to enforce and collect the arrearages until they are paid in full or until the court, in accordance with State and federal law and regulations and the Rules of Court, as applicable, terminates the Probation Division's supervision of the support order.
Orders entered by other jurisdictions
      The bill would not apply to child support provisions contained in orders or judgments entered by a foreign jurisdiction and registered in New Jersey for modification or enforcement pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, P.L.1998, c.2 (C.2A:4-30.65 et seq.), or a law or procedure substantially similar to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1952, c.197 (C.2A:4-30.1 et seq.) but subsequently repealed, or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, originally adopted in New Jersey as P.L.1981, c.243 (C.2A:4-30.24 et seq.) but also subsequently repealed.
Committee Amendments
      The committee amendments to the bill:
      - add an additional exception to the bills default standard that child support terminates when a child reaches age 19, which provides that child support would not terminate if the child is in an out-of-home placement through the Division of Child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families;
      - remove language stating that a child could file a petition with the court concerning obligations to pay child support;
      - provide instead that a parent or guardian may submit a written request to the court with supporting documentation, including a projected future date when support will terminate, if appropriate, seeking the continuation of child support beyond 19 years of age;
      - clarify that any order for continuation of the obligation to pay child support beyond age 19 would be based on the written request of the parent or guardian;
      - add a provision that a notice of the continuation of the obligation and the future termination date, when ordered, would be provided to the parties; and
      - add a provision specifying that nothing in the bill would be construed to prevent a parent or guardian responsible for paying child support from petitioning the court for the termination of child support or for emancipation of a child prior to the age of 19 for good cause, or from petitioning the court to contest the extension of child support beyond the age of 19 as provided in the bill.
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http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S2.HTM

STATEMENT TO
[First Reprint]
SENATE, No. 1046
with Senate Floor Amendments
(Proposed by Senator TURNER)
ADOPTED: DECEMBER 18, 2014
      These floor amendments make several changes to the provisions of the underlying bill, which clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law, with exceptions for extending support until a child reaches, at a maximum, 23 years of age.
      These changes include:
      - requiring two notices of proposed termination of child support when a child reaches 19 years of age (the general default for termination), for any support orders administered by the Probation Division of the Superior Court, cooperatively provided to both parents by the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency. The first notice would be sent at least 180 days prior to the proposed termination date, and the second at least 90 days prior thereto;
      - clarifying references to custodial parent (instead of parent or guardian), as being the party responsible for seeking the continuation of child support when such support is scheduled to terminate;
      - providing for the continuation of child support beyond a child reaching 19 years of age, based on an application to the court following notice of child support termination, when a child is a student in a post-secondary education program and enrolled for the number of hours or courses the school considers to be full-time attendance during some part of each of any five calendar months of the year;
      - providing for the continuation of child support beyond a child reaching 19 years of age, based on an application to the court following notice of child support termination, due to the child having a physical or mental disability, as determined by a federal or State governmental agency, that existed prior to the child reaching the age of 19;
      - providing for the continuation of child support, based on an application to the court not tied to any termination notice, due to exceptional circumstances as may be approved by the court;
      - indicating the courts authority to continue child support beyond the date a child reaches 19 years of age upon a custodial parents application, based upon the parent establishing sufficient proof for such continuation using the continuation request form, as promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts, and other supporting documentation submitted to the court;
      - indicating that a parent responsible for paying child support who disagrees with the courts decision to continue child support may, at any time, file a motion seeking relief from that obligation;
      - providing for the termination of child support without court order on the date that a child, regardless of age, marries, dies, or enters the military service;
      - providing for the termination of child support on a date after a child reaches 19 years of age, as specified by court order, but which date would not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age;
      - establishing that, notwithstanding the bills provisions for child support continuation, the obligation to pay child support terminates when a child reaches 23 years of age, but nothing prevents the payment of an alternate form of financial support or reimbursement from a parent for that child;
      - clarifying references throughout the bill to child support in order to demonstrate that the bill exclusively addresses this and not other alternative forms of financial support; and
      - including, in the bills effective date section, a delayed effective date of the first day of the 13th month following enactment, and indicating that the Administrative Office of the Courts and the Department of Human Services (the State IV-D agency) would cooperate to take any anticipatory administrative action, including with respect to the termination of child support notices provided in the bill, as needed for the bills implementation.
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http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/S1500/1046_S1.HTM

STATEMENT TO

[Second Reprint]
SENATE, No. 1046

with Assembly Floor Amendments
(Proposed by Assemblyman GUSCIORA)

ADOPTED: DECEMBER 3, 2015
      This bill clarifies certain circumstances under which the obligation to pay child support would terminate by operation of law.
      Under the bill, the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency would cooperatively provide both parents with at least two notices of a proposed termination of child support, which would include information and the request form to facilitate the continuation of child support beyond the date the child reaches 19 years of age. These floor amendments provide that the two notices would be required to be in writing. In addition, the amendments provide that to the extent feasible the Probation Division and the State IV-D agency would cooperatively provide additional notice to the parents by text message, telephone message, or other electronic means.
      The amendments also remove the reference to the term emancipation in the bill because the bills provisions relate only to the obligation to pay child support, and not to other parental duties, rights, and responsibilities. As amended, nothing in the bill would affect the authority of the court to make judicial determinations regarding the legal emancipation of a child.
      In addition, the amendments require the Administrative Office of the Courts and the State IV-D agency to prepare and make available to the public information            regarding the termination of child support obligations pursuant to the bill, including but not limited to: how parents may establish an alternative termination age or event; how support may be extended beyond the of age 19 under certain circumstances; and how parents may contest the continuation or termination of support as provided in the bill.
      The remaining amendments are technical in nature.

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NJSBA Family Law Section