Solo and Small-Firm Section

Municipal Court Law Review Winter 2014

1. Police Officer reading inaccurate refusal warning is not a defense to refusal charge

State v. O’Driscoll 215 NJ 461 (2013)

          The police officer’s errors in the reading of the standard statement informing defendant of the consequences of refusing to provide a breath sample were not material in light of the statutory purpose to inform motorists and impel compliance.  The officer’s misstatements could not have reasonably affected defendant’s choice to refuse to provide a breath sample, and do not require reversal of defendant’s conviction for refusal.

2. Court must examine perceived attorney conflict before hearing motion to adjourn.

State v Vasquez  432 NJ Super 354 (App. Div. 2013)

The court considered the recurring dilemma confronting trial courts when a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with representation by current counsel at sentencing after the court has denied an adjournment request to obtain new counsel.  The court placed on the record strong and sustainable reasons justifying denial of the adjournment request.  However, because the court failed to address defense counsel's perceived conflict in his continued representation of defendant, the court was constrained to vacate the sentence and remand.    

3. No suppression of blood result from 2008 based on 2013 new case

State v Adkins __ NJ Super. __ (App. Div. 2013) A-5748-12T4 

Addressing the impact of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, (2013), on pending cases involving warrantless blood tests, the court reversed a trial court order suppressing blood evidence in a DWI and assault-by-auto case. Consistent with long-standing rulings of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the police obtained the blood sample from defendant without a search warrant. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court unexpectedly changed the legal landscape by issuing a ruling that construed the Fourth Amendment more broadly than our Court.

         On these facts, under Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419,   suppression would not be the appropriate remedy under federal constitutional law, because the New Jersey police were acting lawfully under established New Jersey precedent at the time of the search. Further, had our own Supreme Court issued the McNeely ruling as a construction of the New Jersey Constitution, the ruling would not have been applied retroactively. Under these unusual and very limited circumstances, the court held that suppression of the evidence in this case was not required.

4. Defendant can be entitled to Adjournment to Select Own Counsel. State v Kates __ NJ __ (2014) (A-40-12)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Ostrer’s opinion below. Deprivation of a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is found where, as here, a trial court denies an adjournment without properly considering the relevant factors or abuses its discretion in doing so.

      The Appellate Division held Defendant Entitled to Adjournment to Select Own Counsel. State v. Kates 426 NJ Super. 32 (App. Div. 2012)

      The Appellate Division concluded the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion in denying defendant a continuance to enable him to retain counsel of his choice, after he learned on the eve of trial that the assistant deputy public defender who had been representing him was about to deployed for active military service.  Although the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and may be balanced against the court's interest in managing its calendar, the trial court failed to weigh the appropriate factors governing the discretionary decision whether to grant the requested continuance.  The availability of competent counsel not of defendant's choice was an insufficient basis for denying the continuance.  As deprivation of counsel of choice is a structural error not subject to harmless error analysis, reversal of defendant's conviction and a new trial is mandated.

5 Juvenile adjudication does not bar adult expungement. In the Matter of the Expungement Application of D.J.B. __ NJ __ (2014)

         Based on its language and legislative history, N.J.S.A. 2C: 52-4.1(a) applies only to the expungement of juvenile adjudications and does not transform a juvenile adjudication into a "crime" that would bar a later attempt to expunge an adult conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2.  

7. After eviction, tenant does not have expectation of privacy State v Hinton 216 NJ 211(2013)

          Where, as here, an eviction proceeding has advanced to the point that a warrant of removal has been executed, a tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Therefore, the police action in Hinton’s apartment was not a “search” under either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.

8. Failure by State Police to create and maintain a centralized statewide database not a violation of the Supreme Court Chun Order. 

State v Chun 215 NJ 489 (2013)   

          The Supreme Court on March 17, 2008 issued it’s unanimous opinion addressing the challenges raised by defendants to the scientific reliability of the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C (the Alcotest).

     The defendant drivers moved for an Order in Aid of Litigants’ Rights, see R. 1:10-3, contending that the State has failed to comply with this Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, principally by failing to create and maintain a centralized statewide database, and asserting more specifically that the database lacks integrity because it differs from the manner in which data was previously stored on and available on CD-ROM, is incomplete as to certain types of files and calibration cycles, is presented in a format different from the one noted in the report of the Special Master, and is subject to the third-party software developer’s fee,

     The defendants requested that the NJ Supreme Court deem the State to have violated the March 17, 2008, Order and that The Supreme Court therefore direct the State to redesign the database to comply with defendants’ understanding of the meaning and intent of this Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, and that the Supreme Court further direct the State to ensure the integrity of the data in the database and order other relief.

     The Attorney General’s office responded to the factual assertions concerning the integrity and operation of the centralized statewide database raised by defendants through the affidavits of Howard J. Baum, Ph.D., Director of the Office of Forensic Sciences (OFS), a Division of the New Jersey State Police, and of Ali M. Alaouie, Ph.D., an OFS research scientist charged with oversight and monitoring of Alcotest data downloads and database integrity.

     The Attorney General’s office moved for it’s own Order in Aid of Litigant’s Rights seeking to modify the Court’s March 17, 2008, Order and to authorize the State to continue to utilize the Alcotest with Firmware version 3.11, which was evaluated during the proceedings that led to The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Opinion and Order.

     The Attorney General’s office requested that the State be relieved of further compliance with Paragraph 2 of this Court’s Order of March 17, 2008, based on the State’s representation that Firmware 3.13, which is the Alcotest software that was created in conjunction with Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. (Draeger), the manufacturer and supplier of the Alcotest, in compliance with Paragraph 2 of The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, would effectively render the previously created database unusable and unworkable.

     The Attorney General’s office represented to the Court that Draeger has advised that the Alcotest will no longer be serviceable after 2016 and that the State is now in the process of evaluating alternate breath testing devices for implementation.

     The defendant also moved for an Order in Aid of Litigants’ Rights, see R. 1:10-3, contending that, absent compliance with Paragraph 2 of the Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, which directed that the specified software changes be made “forthwith”, the Alcotest is unsuitable for use in New Jersey, and should not be used.

      The defendants challenged the reliability of the Alcotest 7110 utilizing Firmware version 3.11 both in general and in particular through reiteration of and expansion upon arguments raised during the proceedings that led to this Court’s March 17, 2008, Opinion, including defendant’s challenge to the Firmware’s utilization of the fuel cell drift algorithm and the absence of implementation of software to account for the demonstrated physiological differences that impede the ability of women over the age of sixty to provide a sufficient breath sample and that therefore raised the specter of inappropriate charges being brought against such women for refusal, see N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4.

     The defendants requested that the Supreme Court declare that the Alcotest is not sufficiently scientifically reliable to be utilized in any prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendants were denied most of the relief they sought.

          The Supreme Court concluded that the centralized statewide database was fully in compliance with this Court’s Order of March 17, 2008, in all respects.

          The Supreme Court concluded that defendants have failed to demonstrate that the State has “willfully refused” to comply with The Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order, see Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 141 n.2 (2006), and that the State has demonstrated that in spite of its best efforts to do so, it does not have the ability to comply with Paragraph 2 of the Order, see Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.366, 392 (1995), because of the unanticipated but unavoidable adverse impact of compliance that the implementation of Firmware version 3.13 would have upon the continued viability of the existing database.

     The Supreme Court concluded that the Alcotest 7110, utilizing Firmware version 3.11, remains scientifically reliable, and generates results that are admissible to prove a per se violation of the statutory prohibitions on driving while under the influence of alcohol, when those results are utilized in strict compliance with Paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and the associated worksheets attached to this Court’s March 17, 2008, Order.

          The Supreme Court concluded that although Paragraph 1(A)(3) of the Supreme Court’s March 17, 2008, Order directed that certain AIR results be inadmissible in prosecutions of women over the age of sixty for violations of the refusal statute, see N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, a further remedy is now necessary to protect the equal protection rights of women falling into that category.

9.   New law finally establishes a Conditional Dismissal Program in Municipal Court. Ken Vercammen testified in favor of the passage before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.

Governor Chris Christie on September 9 signed into law legislation co-sponsored by Senator Christopher “Kip” Bateman (R-Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex and Somerset) to provide a conditional assistance program in Municipal Court for certain first-time offenders. The law took affect in January 2014. However, the law requires a defendant to plead guilty as a partial of the program.

“This initiative will give a broader range of first-time offenders who have committed a minor offense an opportunity to turn their lives around,” Bateman said. “The program will help foster participants’ rehabilitation and future success by giving them appropriate penalties without having the offense be a part of their permanent criminal record.” This law also helps Police and Prosecutors since it requires a guilty plea, thus reducing the need for trials and officer testimony.

Under prior law, the only offenses eligible for a conditional discharge were certain drug-related offenses. Bateman’s S-2588 allows discharge for many non-drug offenses, such as disorderly person’s offenses, which have not been able to participate in similar programs before.

“First-time offenders who are screened to meet the eligibility requirements will be able to use the program to avoid having a record that cannot be expunged until years after the sentence is served,” Bateman added. “The legislation will also help courts efficiently adjudicate cases without costly logjams.”

Under this law, conditional dismissal is not available to any person who has previously participated in a conditional discharge, conditional dismissal, or supervisory treatment program such as PTI. In addition, a person is not eligible for conditional dismissal if the offense for which the person is charged involved:

• • organized criminal or gang activity;
• a continuing criminal business or enterprise;
• a breach of the public trust by a public officer or employee;
• domestic violence;
• an offense against an elderly, disabled or minor person;
• an offense involving driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug;
• animal cruelty;
• • or any disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense under chapter 35 or 36 of the Criminal Code. [Although first offender drug defendants are eligible for Conditional Discharge]

  After taking into consideration the eligibility criteria, the defendant’s criminal history and the prosecutor’s recommendation, the court may, approve the defendant’s participation in the conditional dismissal program and place the defendant under a probation monitoring status for a period of one year.

  This law establishes a conditional dismissal program in municipal court similar to the existing supervisory treatment programs for pre-trial intervention and conditional discharge.

  Previously, the supervisory treatment programs for pre-trial intervention and conditional discharge allow the court to suspend proceedings against eligible defendants while the defendants participate in supervisory treatment.  Persons who are charged with indictable offenses (crimes of the first, second, third, or fourth degree) may be eligible for pretrial intervention (“PTI”) pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-12 et seq.  Persons charged with certain disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons drug offenses may be eligible for conditional discharge pursuant to N.J.S.2C:36A-1.  If the defendant violates a term or condition of supervisory treatment, the court may enter a judgment of conviction or, where the defendant did not previously plead guilty and was not previously found guilty, resume the criminal proceedings.  If the defendant successfully completes the program, the criminal charges are dismissed.

  CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL PROGRAM. This law establishes a similar diversion program in municipal court to be known as the conditional dismissal program.  Under the provisions of the law, a defendant who is charged with a petty disorderly persons offense or disorderly persons offense may apply to enter into the conditional dismissal program, provided the defendant  has not been previously convicted of any offense or crime under any law of the United States, this State or any other state.  A defendant may make an application to the conditional dismissal program after a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt, but prior to the entry of judgment of conviction.

  FINGERPRINTING REQUIREMENT.  To allow sufficient time for verification of the defendant’s criminal history by the prosecutor and as a condition of the application, the defendant will be required to submit to the fingerprint identification procedures as provided in R.S.53:1-15 before making an application to the court.

  CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL PROGRAM ELIGIBILITY. Conditional dismissal will not be available to any person who has previously participated in conditional discharge, conditional dismissal, or PTI.  In addition, conditional dismissal will not be available if the offense for which the person is charged involved: organized criminal or gang activity; a continuing criminal business or enterprise; a breach of the public trust by a public officer or employee; domestic violence; an offense against an elderly, disabled or minor person; an offense involving driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug; animal cruelty laws; or any disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense under chapter 35 or 36 of the Criminal Code (drugs and drug paraphernalia). However, a person who is charged with a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense involving drugs or drug paraphernalia may apply for a conditional discharge in accordance with N.J.S.2C:36A-1.

  In addition to these eligibility criteria, the court considering the application must also consider the following factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the facts surrounding the commission of the offense; the motivation, age, character and attitude of the defendant; the desire of the complainant or victim to forego prosecution; the needs and interests of the victim and the community; the extent to which the defendant’s offense constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior; whether the offense is of an assaultive or violent nature, either in the act itself or in the possible injurious consequences of such behavior; whether the applicant's participation will adversely affect the prosecution of codefendants; whether diversion of the defendant from prosecution is consistent with the public interest; and any other factors deemed relevant by the court.

  If the court approves a defendant’s participation in the conditional dismissal program over the municipal prosecutor’s objection, that order will, upon the request of the prosecutor, be stayed for a period of 10 days in order to permit the prosecutor to appeal the order to the Superior Court.

  PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.  After taking into consideration the eligibility criteria, the defendant’s criminal history and the prosecutor’s recommendation, the court may approve the defendant’s participation in the conditional dismissal program and place the defendant under a probation monitoring status for a period of one year. The court may also impose financial obligations and other terms and conditions in accordance with the law.  The law permits the defendant to apply to the court for an extension of the term of conditional dismissal to allow sufficient time to pay financial obligations imposed by the court.  In addition, a judge could extend the term for good cause.

  If a defendant who is participating in conditional dismissal is convicted of any offense or crime under any law of the United States, this State or any other state, or otherwise fails to comply with the terms and conditions imposed by the court, the court can enter a judgment of conviction and impose a fine, penalty, or other assessment in accordance with the defendant’s prior plea of guilty or prior finding of guilt.

  If, at the end of the term, the defendant has not been convicted of any subsequent offense or crime under any law of the United States, this State or any other state, and has complied with any other terms and conditions imposed by the court, the court may terminate the probation monitoring and dismiss the proceedings against the defendant.

  The law provides that a conditional dismissal of a petty disorderly persons or disorderly persons offense granted pursuant to the program will not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifications or disabilities, but shall be reported to the State Bureau of Identification criminal history record information files for purposes of determining future eligibility or exclusion from court diversion programs.  A conditional dismissal granted will not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of determining whether a second or subsequent offense has occurred under any law of this State.

  LIMITATION.  A conditional dismissal can only be granted once with respect to any defendant.

  CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL APPLICATION FEE AND ASSESSMENT.  A person applying for admission to the conditional dismissal program will pay to the court an application fee of $75.  The fee would be deposited in the newly created “Municipal Court Diversion Fund” established under the law. Monies in this new fund will be used to offset the cost of intake and monitoring services related to the conditional dismissal program.  If admitted into the program, the defendant would also be required to pay any restitution, costs, and other mandatory assessments that would have been imposed by law for a conviction of the offense charged.

  A municipal court judge may impose an assessment, based on the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant that shall not exceed the amount of a fine that would have been imposed for conviction of the offense charged.  Such assessment would be distributed in the same manner as a fine for the offense.

  A defendant would be advised of these financial conditions prior to seeking entry into the program.

  The law allows the defendant to apply for a waiver of the fee by reason of poverty.  The court may also permit the defendant to pay the conditional dismissal fee and other assessments in installments or order other alternatives pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2009, c.317 (C.2B:12-23.1).  Under the provisions of that enactment, the court has several options available if it finds that a person does not have the ability to pay a penalty in full or has failed to pay a previously imposed penalty.  The court may reduce, suspend, or modify the installment plan; order that credit be given against the amount owed for each day of confinement if the court finds that the person has served jail time for the default; revoke any unpaid portion of the penalty; order the person to perform community service in lieu of payment of the penalty; or impose any other alternative permitted by law.

  MUNICIPAL COURT DIVERSION FUND.  The law establishes a new dedicated, non-lapsing fund to be known as the "Municipal Court Diversion Fund," which will be administered by the Administrative Office of the Courts.  The fund will be the depository of the $75 application fee for the conditional dismissal program.  Monies in the fund will be used to offset the cost of intake and monitoring services for defendants under the conditional dismissal program.

  CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. Currently, the conditional discharge statute, N.J.S.2C:36A-1, provides that the $75 fee, which is charged for this program, is used to defray the costs of juror compensation. However, this provision is outdated since these monies are no longer used to defray the costs of juror compensation, but instead are paid to the State Treasurer to for deposit in the General Fund. This law updates this section of law accordingly.

  Under the current provisions of the conditional discharge statute, a person is not eligible for conditional discharge if that person has committed a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons drug offense under any law of the United States, this State or any other state. The law amends section a. of N.J.S.2C:36A-1 to also provide that a person who has participated in any supervisory treatment program or the conditional dismissal program established under the law will not be eligible for participation in the conditional discharge program.

  SUPERVISORY TREATMENT (PTI).  Similar to the conditional discharge statute, the PTI statute, N.J.S.2C:43-12, provides that the $75 fee charged for the program is used to defray the costs of juror compensation. Since these monies are no longer used to defray the costs of juror compensation, the law updates this section of law accordingly.

  Under the current provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-12, PTI may only occur once and any person who has previously received PTI is not eligible for subsequent PTI. This law expands this provision by providing that a person who has participated in either conditional dismissal or conditional discharge will not be eligible for PTI.

  The law amends the conditional discharge and PTI statutes to provide that the court may allow the payment of the fees and other financial obligations in installments.

  EXPUNGEMENT. The law amends N.J.S.2C:52-6 concerning expungement of arrests not resulting in conviction to allow for expungement of charges dismissed pursuant to conditional discharge or conditional dismissal six months after the entry of the order of dismissal. Currently, this section allows for expungement for a person who has had charges dismissed as a result of participation in a supervisory treatment program.

   

  10. Top New Court Rules 2013 limit discovery fees

   

  Rule 7:7-7 g …….. If any discoverable materials known to a party have not been supplied, the party obligated with providing that discovery shall also provide the opposing party with a listing of the materials that are missing and explain why they have not been supplied. ……

   

  Rule 7:7-7 (h) Motions for Discovery. No motion for discovery shall be made unless the prosecutor and defendant have conferred and attempted to reach agreement on any discovery issues, including any issues pertaining to discovery provided through the use of CD, DVD, e-mail, internet or other electronic means.

   

• Rule 7:7-7 (i) Discovery Fees limited to OPRA rates

      (1) Standard Fees. The fee assessed for discovery embodied in the form of printed matter shall be $0.05 per letter size page or smaller, and $0.07 per legal size page or larger. From time to time, as necessary, these rates may be revised pursuant to a schedule promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. If the prosecutor can demonstrate that the actual costs for copying discovery exceed the foregoing rates, the prosecutor shall be permitted to charge a reasonable amount equal to the actual costs of copying. The actual copying costs shall be the costs of materials and supplies used to copy the discovery, but shall not include the costs of labor or other overhead expenses associated with making the copies, except as provided for in paragraph (i)(2) of this rule. Electronic records and non-printed materials shall be provided free of charge, but the prosecutor may charge for the actual costs of any needed supplies such as computer discs.

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Index

1. Police Officer reading inaccurate refusal warning is not a defense to refusal charge

State v. O’Driscoll

2. Court must examine perceived attorney conflict before hearing motion to adjourn.

State v Vasquez 

3.No suppression of blood result from 2008 based on 2013 new case

State v Adkins

4. Defendant can be entitled to Adjournment to Select Own Counsel. State v Kates

5.   Juvenile adjudication does not bar adult expungement. In the Matter of the Expungement Application of D.J.B

6. If no probable cause to arrest, search of person is improper State v. Gibson 

7. After eviction, tenant does not have expectation of privacy State v Hinton

8. Failure by State Police to create and maintain a centralized statewide database not a violation of the Supreme Court Chun Order. 

State v Chun

9. New law finally establishes a Conditional Dismissal Program in Municipal Court.

10. Top New Court Rules 2013 limit discovery fees